An extended visual cryptography scheme, EVCS for short, for an access structure (? Qual ; ? Forb ) on a set of n participants, is a technique to encode n images in such a way that when we stack together the transparencies associated to participants in any set X 2 ? Qual we get the secret message with no trace of the original images, but any X 2 ? Forb has no information on the shared image. Moreover, after the original images are encoded they are still meaningful, that is, any user will recognize the image on his transparency. The main contributions of this paper are the following:
Introduction
A visual cryptography scheme for a set P of n participants is a method to encode a secret image SI into n shadow images called shares, where each participant in P receives one share. Certain quali ed subsets of participants can \visually" recover the secret image, but other, forbidden, sets of participants have no information (in an information-theoretic sense) on SI. A \visual" recovery for a set X P consists of xeroxing the shares given to the participants in X onto transparencies, and then stacking them. The participants in a quali ed set X will be able to see the secret image without any knowledge of cryptography and without performing any cryptographic computation. The schemes we consider are unconditional secure in that any forbidden set of participants does not gain information about the shared image, even though it has access to an in nite computational power. Visual cryptography schemes are characterized by two parameters: The pixel expansion, which is the number of sub-pixels each pixel of the original image is encoded into on each transparency, and the contrast which measures the \di erence" between a black and a white pixel in the reconstructed image.
This cryptographic paradigm was introduced by Naor and Shamir 13] . They analyzed the case of a (k; n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes, in which the secret image is visible if and only if any k transparencies are stacked together. Further results on (k; n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes can be found in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 16] . The model by Naor and Shamir has been extended in 1, 2] to general access structures (an access structure is a speci cation of all quali ed and forbidden subsets of participants) and general techniques to construct visual cryptography schemes for any access structure have been proposed. In 6] the authors propose k out of n visual cryptography schemes achieving a greater relative di erence than previously known schemes. In the case of 2 out of n visual cryptography schemes the scheme given in 6] achieves the best possible value for the relative di erence. In 9] it is presented a new technique to construct k out of n visual cryptography schemes. Finally, in 11], using a linear programming technique, the authos gave constructions for (k; n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes having large relative di erence, for k 2 f3; 4; ng. Also, for k = 2, they have independently derived some results similar to the ones in 6] for certain values of n.
In implementing visual cryptography schemes it would be useful to conceal the existence of the secret message, namely, the shares given to participants in the scheme should not look as a random bunch of pixels, but they should be images (an house, a dog, a tree, ...). As an example, let P = f1; 2; 3g and consider the access structure ? Qual = ff1; 2g; f2; 3g; f1;2;3gg (we stipulate that all remaining subsets of P are forbidden). We would like to share the picture S in such a way that the share of participant 1 is the picture A the share of participant 2 is the picture B , and the share of participant 3 is the picture C . This shares distribution should have the property that when participants 1 and 2, or participants 2 and 3, or participants 1, 2, and 3 stack together their transparencies they get the secret image S (the shares generated by an extended visual cryptography scheme for ? Qual are given in Appendix A).
An extended visual cryptography scheme for an access structure (? Qual ; ? Forb ) on a set of n participants, is a technique to encode n images in such a way that when we stack together the transparencies associated to participants in any set X 2 ? Qual we get the secret message with no trace of the original images, but any X 2 ? Forb has no information on the shared image. Moreover, after the original images are encoded they are still meaningful, that is, any user will recognize the image on his transparency.
Naor and Shamir 13] rst considered the problem of concealing the existence of the secret message for the case of 2 out of 2 threshold VCS. Droste 9] considered the problem of sharing more than one secret image among a set of participants. For example, in the appendix of 9], a 2 out of 3 threshold visual cryptography scheme is presented in which each pair of transparencies reveals a di erent secret image. A construction is given to obtain visual cryptography schemes in which di erent subsets of transparencies reveal different secret images. This construction also provides a method of obtaining extended visual cryptography schemes; however, it is not as e cient as the method presented in this paper.
Visual cryptography schemes have been also considered in 12, 14, 15, 16] . In 14] an alternative reconstruction method for visual cryptography schemes is studied. This method yields a higher contrast in the reconstructed image for 2 out of n threshold schemes, but the technique is not applicable to k out of n threshold schemes with k 3. Visual cryptography schemes to encrypt coloured images are given in 12, 15, 16] .
In this paper we study extended visual cryptography schemes, EVCS for short, for any ? 0 = fA 2 ? Qual : A 0 6 2 ? Qual for all A 0 A; A 0 6 = Ag: A participant P 2 P is an essential participant if there exists a set X P such that X fPg 2 ? Qual but X 6 2 ? Qual . If a participant P is not essential then we can construct a visual cryptography scheme giving him nothing as his/her share. In fact, a non-essential participant does not need to participate \actively" in the reconstruction of the image, since the information he/she has is not needed by any set in P in order to recover the shared image. In any VCS having non-essential participants, these participants do not require any information in their shares. Therefore, we assume throughout this paper that all participants are essential.
In the case where ? Qual is monotone increasing, ? Forb is monotone decreasing, and ? Qual ? Forb = 2 P , the access structure is said to be strong, and ? 0 is termed a basis. (This situation is the usual setting for traditional secret sharing.) In a strong access structure, Formally, the two collections of p m matrices D t , with t 2 f0; 1g, obtained by restricting each n m matrix in C t to rows i 1 ; i 2 ; : : :; i p are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the same matrices with the same frequencies.
Each pixel of the original image will be encoded into n pixels, each of which consists of m sub-pixels. To share a white (black, resp.) pixel, the dealer randomly chooses one of the matrices in C 0 (C 1 , resp.), and distributes row i to participant i. The chosen matrix de nes the m sub-pixels in each of the n transparencies. Observe that the size of the collections C 0 and C 1 does not need to be the same.
The rst property is related to the contrast of the image. It states that when a quali ed set of users stack their transparencies they can correctly recover the image shared by the dealer. The value (m) is called relative di erence, the number (m) m is referred to as the contrast of the image, the set f(X; t X )g X2? Qual is called the set of thresholds, and t X is the threshold associated to X 2 ? Qual .. We want the contrast to be as large as possible and at least one, that is, (m) 1=m. The second property is called security, since it implies that, even by inspecting all their shares, a forbidden set of participants cannot gain any information in deciding whether the shared pixel was white or black.
Notice that if a set of participants X is a superset of a quali ed set X 0 , then they can recover the shared image by considering only the shares of the set X 0 . This does not in itself rule out the possibility that stacking all the transparencies of the participants in X does not reveal any information about the shared image.
Let M be a matrix in the collection C 0 C 1 of a (? Qual ; ? Forb ; m)-VCS on a set of participants P. For X P, let M X denote the m-vector obtained by considering the or of the vectors corresponding to participants in X; whereas M X] denotes the jXj m matrix obtained from M by considering only the rows corresponding to participants in X.
We make a couple of observations about the structure of ? Qual and ? Forb in light of the above de nition. First, it is clear that any subset of a forbidden subset is forbidden, so ? Forb is necessarily monotone decreasing. Second, it is also easy to see that no superset of a quali ed subset is forbidden. Hence, a strong access structure is simply one in which ? Qual is monotone increasing and ? Qual ? Forb = 2 P .
Notice also that, given an (admissible) access structure (? Qual ; ? Forb ), we can \embed" it in a strong access structure (? 0 Qual ; ? 0 Forb ) in which ? Qual ? 0 Qual and ? Forb ? 0 Forb . One way to so this is to take (? 0 Qual ; ? 0 Forb ) to be the strong access structure having as basis ? 0 , where ? 0 consists of the minimal sets in ? Qual , as usual. In view of the above observations, it su ces to construct VCS for strong access structures.
Basis Matrices
The constructions in this paper are realized using two n m matrices, S 0 and S 1 The collections C 0 and C 1 are obtained by permuting the columns of the corresponding basis matrix (S 0 for C 0 and S 1 for C 1 ) in all possible ways. Note that, in this case, the size of the collections C 0 and C 1 is the same and it is denoted by r. This technique has been introduced in 13]. The algorithm for the VCS based on the previous construction of the collections C 0 and C 1 has small memory requirements (it keeps only the basis matrices S 0 and S 1 ) and it is e cient (to choose a matrix in C 0 (C 1 , resp.) it only generates a permutation of the columns of S 0 (S 1 , resp.)).
Extended Visual Cryptography Schemes
To realize a VCS for an access structure ? on a set of n participants we want to encode a secret image into n shares in such a way that the properties of De nition 2.1 are satis ed. In the case of EVCSs the n shares have to be images. Therefore, we start with n+1 images (the rst n are associated with the n participants whereas the last one is the secret image)
to obtain n shares that have to be still meaningful, that is, any user is able to see the image in his transparency we started with. Hence, any technique to implement EVCSs has to take into consideration the colour of the pixel in the secret image we want to obtain.
In the following, we will refer to the colour of a white (black) pixel as a w pixel (b pixel). himself, without the concurrence of other participants. In this paper we assume that there is no isolated participant in the access structure. This assumption is not so strong as it could seem, since it does not make sense to consider isolated participants in EVCS. If we allow access structure to contain isolated participants in EVCS, then this would mean that from a meaningful picture (the one held by the isolated participant) we are able to get the secret image just looking at it, without performing any cryptographic computation. Clearly, this is impossible, unless the picture held by the isolated participant is the secret itself. Hence, through this paper we assume that the access structures do not contain isolated participant. 3. After the original images are encoded they are still meaningful, that is, any user will recognize the image on his transparency. The
The rst condition states that a quali ed set of users, belonging to ? Qual , stacking their transparencies can correctly recover the secret image. The second condition is related to the security of the scheme, it implies that by inspecting the shares associated to a non quali ed subset of participants one cannot gain any information on the shared image even though he knows the original images of all n participants we started with. Clearly, conditions 1 and 2 are equivalent to state that for any c 1 ; : : :; c n 2 fb; wg, the pair of collections The dealer on input n + 1 images, that is, the images for the n participants and the secret image, generates n shares to be distributed to the participants. In such a scheme we have that F = S = 1=4.
7 Optimal Contrast (k; k)-threshold EVCS
In this section we prove an upper bound on the relative di erences F (m) and S (m) of any (k; k)-threshold EVCS. We characterize the admissible region for the relative di erences F (m) and S (m) and for any pair of values in this region we show how to construct a (k,k)-threshold EVCS with those relative di erences.
The following lemma has been proved in 1]; we repeat its proof here for the reader's convenience. We will use it in our constructions for extended visual cryptography schemes. With we denote the operator \concatenation" of two matrices. for j 6 = i. Indeed, if k is even, then, up to a column permutation, the matrix B (resp., N) does not change when we complement its entries; whereas, if k is odd, then, up to a column permutation, complementing the entries of the matrix B (resp., N) we get as result the matrix N (resp., B). Since m w H (M X ), we have that Therefore, as m must be an integer, we get that m 2 k?1 + 2.
In Section 5 we present a general technique to implement extended visual cryptography schemes, which uses hypergraph colourings. This technique yields to (k; k)-threshold EVCSs which, according to the previous corollary, are optimal with respect to the pixel expansion. If T be a k h matrix whose entries are all equal to 0 and let S 0 and S 1 be the basis matrices of a (k; k)-threshold VCS de ned as follows: S 0 is the matrix whose columns are all the boolean k-vectors having an even number of`1's, and S 1 is the matrix whose columns are all the boolean k-vectors having an odd number of`1's. The following protocol realizes a (k; k)-threshold EVCS. In this construction, we describe how to encode k pixels, one for each of the input images, to obtain a pixel of the secret image. Clearly, to encode the whole images we repeat the next protocol on all the pixels in the images. We will have more to say about chromatic numbers of hypergraphs later on, but for now we observe that (H) jXj for any hypergraph H = (X; B). This is easily seen by assigning a di erent colour to every vertex. (This colouring will be called the trivial colouring.)
Our general construction for extended VCS, which we present in Figure 2 , uses an arbitrary q-colouring of the hypergraph (P; ? 0 ). In this construction, we describe how to encode n pixels, one for each of the input images, to obtain a pixel of the secret image.
Clearly, to encode the whole images we repeat the protocol of Figure 2 on all the pixels in the images.
Input:
1. An access structure (? Qual ; ? Forb ) on a set P of n participants. The matrix D we concatenated to S 0 and S 1 to obtain the collections C c 1 c 2 c , where c; c 1 ; c 2 2 fb; wg, is constructed as follows D = that this is not the case. Then some component of D X is zero, say the jth component. It follows that (i 1 ) = : : : = (i jXj ) = j, which contradicts the fact that is a q-colouring of the hypergraph (P; ? 0 ). 
Applications
In the construction of Figure 1 , we would like to minimize q, i.e., by taking q = (H) where H = (P; ? 0 ). In general, however, it is an NP-hard problem to compute the chromatic number of a hypergraph. In particular, determining if a hypergraph has chromatic number equal to two is already an NP-complete problem. Even if we restrict our attention to graphs, the situation is not much better, as it is NP-complete to determine if a graph has chromatic number equal to three. It is NP-hard even to compute an approximation of the chromatic number of a graph. In fact, recently in 10] it has been proved that for some > 0 it is NP-hard to approximate the chromatic number of graphs with n vertices by a factor of n . Moreover, is has been shown that for every > 0 the chromatic number cannot be approximated by a factor of n 1=5? unless NP = ZPP. Other results on the hardness of approximating the chromatic number can be found in 7] . However, we can make use of some known results to get upper bounds and/or exact values of for some interesting classes of access structures. As well, for \small" access structures it is not too di cult to compute the chromatic number.
As far as general bounds are concerned, there is an upper bound on which depends on a suitable de nition of \maximum degree" of a hypergraph. Suppose H = (X; B) is a hypergraph. For a vertex x 2 X, de ne the degree of x to be d(x) = maxfjAj : A B; E \ F = fxg for all E; F 2 A; E 6 = Fg:
(Note that if H is a graph then the de nition of d(x) reduces to the usual graph-theoretic de nition of the degree of x.) Then de ne d max (H) = maxfd(x) : x 2 Xg. Notice that for any hypergraph H = (P; ? 0 ) we have that d max (H) j? 0 j. According to Corollary 4.3 it results that the scheme provided by the previous corollary is optimal with respect to the pixel expansion.
Complete Bipartite Graphs
Suppose that the basis ? 0 is a complete bipartite graph K a;b . It is obvious that the chromatic number of any bipartite graph is equal to two. Also, it was shown in 1, Theorem 
